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The Problem of Ambiguity and Moral Luck for Qur’anic Absolutism 
 
Jake Sinderbrand ‘07 
 
 
This paper argues that the Qur’an succeeds in presenting a basic 
structure of morality, centered upon faith and charity, but it 
ultimately lacks the necessary specificity to form a clear picture of 
righteous conduct to which modern readers can reasonably 
aspire.  More significantly, the dualism of action, belief, and 
consequence that gives the text its force and certainty does not 
seem compatible with the recognition that circumstance plays a 
role in determining what is good and what is bad action. 
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The Problem of Ambiguity and Moral Luck for Qur’anic Absolutism 
 
Jake Sinderbrand ‘07 
 
 
On that day no soul shall suffer the least injustice.  You shall be rewarded 
according only to your deeds. (Qur’an 36:55) 
 
 Every religion must address the problem of inequality 
and injustice in its theodicy, especially if it presumes the absolute 
supremacy of God over evil, as does Islam.  Some religious 
traditions deny any semblance of justice in the world, some insist 
that evil is never what it seems, while others, including Islam, 
defend God against the charge of evil by presupposing a system 
of individual eschatology based upon individual deeds, which is 
naturally reliant upon the assumption of human freedom.  In a 
monotheistic religion, divinely-granted freedom implies some 
sort of absolute morality, which the Qur’an reinforces constantly.  
Furthermore, the Qur’an links its eschatology to each individual’s 
morality (generally as it is manifested through their actions).  
Even if we accept the existence of freewill in some form, people 
commit certain actions and make moral choices based upon 
circumstances over which they have no control.  In a Muslim 
system of eschatology, these actions ultimately weigh in favor of 
or against the individual on the Day of Judgment and may 
contribute to the rewards or punishments that they encounter in 
the afterlife.   
Philosophers state that our moral obligations are tied to 
our luck in this life (we have to be patient in the face of poverty 
only when we are poor, and rich people do not have a moral 
obligation to be patient in the face of poverty).  In addition, the 
morality or immorality of our actions depends on the results of 
these actions (the leaders of the American Revolution are heroes 
because the revolution succeeded, but if it were to fail and result 
in the execution of hundreds of thousands, they would have been 
considered forces of evil.)  If we assume for the sake of argument 
that the claims of the Qur’an are genuine (i.e. that the text is 
indeed the perfect, undiluted word of God), then this fortune of 
circumstance and consequence, commonly termed “moral luck,” 
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coupled with the ambiguous nature of what constitutes just 
action, present an intractable problem for the Qur’an’s claim of 
absolute justice for which it ultimately does not produce a 
satisfactory solution.  
 The assertion in the Qur’an of its own uniqueness and 
truth is not particular to Islam; most religions assert their 
exclusive status as the sole harbingers of divine truth and 
judgment, but few texts assert with such force that the details and 
implications of that truth are naturally easy for the reader to 
understand, and to understand why the revelation must be true.  
Ira Zepp notes that this certainty in the validity of the text is the 
cornerstone of the Islamic system of logic.39  That is, much of the 
intellectual labor performed by Muslim scholars depends upon 
this point to a great extent. 
 The Qur’an is relatively unique in that it is self-aware—
the author or authors write with the intention that the book itself 
be used as a guide for humanity.  This self-awareness gives the 
Qur’an greater force, but does not allow for any imperfections 
within the text itself, as the text must convey a stronger message 
than others in order to prove its validity.  The Qur’an states that 
“to God belongs the convincing argument.” (6:149)40  Thus the 
Qur’an frequently declares its own perfection, and implied in this 
status is ease of understanding for the reader, for it declares, 
“Thus God makes plain to you His revelations, so that you may 
give thought,” (2:266) and states in the simplest fashion, “This 
Book is not to be doubted.” (2:1)41  Despite this assurance, the 
text seems relatively vague regarding most issues of law and 
societal relations, and so a righteous course of action is not always 
clear to the reader.  The Qur’an further complicates this point by 
saying of itself: 
Some of its verses are precise in meaning—they 
are the foundation of the Book—and others are 
ambiguous.  Those whose hearts are infected 
with disbelief observe the ambiguous part, so as 
                                                 
39 Zepp, 194-5 
40 Qur’an 
41 Qur’an 
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to create dissention by seeking to explain it.  But 
no one knows its meaning except God. (3:6-7)42 
 
This passage reinforces the idea that “God guides whom He will 
to a straight path.” (2:213)43  The emphasis of the Qur’an lies in 
the greatness and mercy of God, rather than the actions that 
inspire such mercy.  John Esposito theorizes that the Qur’an’s 
emphasis must be on God rather than human affairs because that 
is the most central point that it reinforces.  Essentially, the 
Qur’an, as a perfect text, will say exactly what it needs to say, and 
the fact that it focuses on the greatness of God and the 
presentation of radical monotheism demonstrates the centrality 
of that notion to all aspects of Islamic law and thought.44 
 The clarity on this point reinforces its importance to 
Muslims, but it leaves specific areas of thought relatively murky.  
One passage of the text can have several legitimate 
interpretations, and that lack of clarity can lead to confusion 
about the actual obligations that will bring reward or punishment 
to an individual.  For example, the Qur’an states in reference to 
idol worship: “Abraham said: ‘Do you serve what you hew, when 
God created you and what you make?’” (37:95)45  Two scholars, 
Zamakhshari and Baydawi, responded to this segment in different 
ways.  Zamakhshari took the passage to generally reflect the 
absurdity of idol worship while Baydawi saw it as emphasizing 
God’s control over humans and what they accomplish, whether it 
seems to be for good or for evil.46  The Qur’an can legitimately 
have different meanings to different readers, but when two 
readers can draw conclusions reflecting different opinions on the 
issue of freewill versus fate from the same passage, the ease of 
understanding of the text comes into question, and then it can 
become unclear what responsibility people have for their actions.  
Esposito notes that such intellectual activity is crucial to 
understanding the Qur’an,47 but it introduces a realm of 
                                                 
42 Qur’an 
43 Qur’an 
44 Esposito, 25 
45 Qur’an 
46 Gätje, 224-6 
47 Esposito, 69 
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thought—and thereby faith—not available to the lay reader, 
which seems to give the intelligent and literate a different 
position in the Muslim world than other Muslims, giving them an 
advantage in understanding the text, and enabling them to adapt 
it to their own systems of belief.  Of course, even two mutually 
exclusive interpretations may still be seen equally valid with 
regard to a certain passage, but the lack of moral certainty is still 
problematic within a largely dualistic framework. 
 The main argument of the Qur’an—that of its legitimacy 
as the one path to God—relies on its force, self-awareness, and 
the certainty with which it is delivered.  Due to this trait, the text 
presents a very dualistic view of the world.  In order to achieve its 
promised clarity, the text must clearly distinguish what is right 
from what is wrong, and these must be diametrically opposed in 
order to establish a straight path.  Esposito claims that action, 
rather than belief, forms the basis of this path,48 although the 
Qur’an itself contains numerous directives regarding faith.  Its 
opening exordium states: “Guide us to the straight path,” (1:6)49 
establishing faith as the means by which to understand the 
necessary course of action. 
 It would be unfair to suggest that Islam in general divides 
the entire world into black and white, as most exegetes and 
philosophers distinguish between levels of good and bad, both in 
terms or actions and consequences in the afterlife.  Kenneth 
Cragg points out that the exegetical tradition has been so strong 
and thorough in attempting to clarify these intermediate points 
of action because the Qur’an cannot address them specifically 
and maintain its multi-vocal (as opposed to univocal) nature.50  
The Qur’an itself makes this distinction occasionally, explaining 
that God could forgive small sins in light of greater good deeds 
and emphasizing both action and intention as important aspects 
of doing good, often repeating the phrase “None should be 
charged with more than one can bear.” (2:233)51  Nonetheless, 
the text generally separates the world into two camps: good or 
evil, divine or profane, blessed or cursed, belief or unbelief.  The 
                                                 
48 Esposito, 68 
49 Qur’an 
50 Cragg, 55 
51 Qur’an 
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opening of the second sura, “The Cow,” first makes this 
distinction, defining the righteous as those: 
Who believe in the unseen and are steadfast in 
prayer; who give in alms from what We gave 
them; who believe in what was revealed to you 
and what was revealed before you, and have 
absolute faith in the life to come.” (2:2-4)52 
It is not the evildoers who are mentioned in contrast, but rather 
the unbelievers, and they are charged with ignorance and 
obtuseness as their most heinous sins: 
It is the same whether or not you forewarn them; 
they will not have faith.  God has set a seal upon 
their hearts and ears; their sight is dimmed and 
grievous punishment awaits them. (2:5-7)53 
Even when gradations of crime and equivalent gradations of 
punishment exist, people are divided according to how “good” or 
“evil” they appear to be based on their actions, and these 
distinctions are murky when life situations differ, and particularly 
when definitions of good and evil differ.  Belief and unbelief, for 
example, do have degrees.  Even in describing the resentment of 
non-Muslim monotheists (People of the Book), the Qur’an 
reminds its readers that “God chooses whom he will for his 
mercy.” (2:106)54  These monotheists are generally not included 
in the term “believer,” but neither are they always cast among the 
“unbelievers.”  The Qur’an seems unclear on whether it is 
unbelief or wrongdoing that distinguishes evil, or indeed what 
the distinction is between them.  Indeed these verses seem to 
suggest that unbelief is the greatest form of wrongdoing, 
although that connection is not established.  Thus, Islam 
becomes a religion of compromised dualism, where good and 
evil, belief and unbelief are set out in a straightforward manner, 
but their specific nature and consequences remain unclear, 
beyond the fact that, in general, the good and the believers are 
rewarded, while the evil and the unbelievers are punished. 
 Thus, the issue of dualism in the Qur’an is at the very 
heart of the problem of moral luck.  Even though the text 
                                                 
52 Qur’an 
53 Qur’an 
54 Qur’an 
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maintains its ambiguity, people fortunate enough to have earlier 
or more significant exposure to the Qur’an are ultimately more 
likely to lead righteous lives according to the broad standards 
that the text sets.  Cragg examines a commonly-held exegetical 
view that non-believers simply cannot understand the text in the 
same way as do believers, or at least those willing to believe, 55 
which reminds us that the Qur’an is ultimately a call to faith, and 
bolstering and inspiring this faith is its central concern.  By 
defining itself as a guide to virtue and implying that anything 
outside of the text will not lead to virtue, the Qur’an presents its 
adherents as better people in general.  This idea becomes 
problematic when we consider that exposure to the Qur’an is 
certainly not equal throughout the world—Islam is not 
predominant in most of the world, and scarcely has any presence 
at all in some societies.  No degree of clarity or proofs within the 
text can completely account for inherent positive or negative 
cultural biases—or ignorance—regarding the legitimacy of Islam 
as a religion and the Qur’an as a religious text. 
 Exegesis is a useful tool to come to terms with these 
issues that the Qur’an does not address directly, as Cragg notes.  
But he also comments that exegesis can give us “a different justice 
to the great original.”56  Ultimately, we must be wary of any 
interpretation, however rational, that presents a position 
different than the ideas conveyed in a plain-sense reading.   
Many exegetes argue that God factors extenuating circumstances 
into His judgment and knows what actions an individual would 
take in any circumstance, and the Qur’an claims that all deeds, 
good and bad, will weigh in favor of or against the individual.57  
Baydawi uses this passage to argue for a scale of reward and 
punishment,58 but that explanation does not solve all of the 
problems associated with moral luck.  The Qur’an mentions 
several virtuous and prohibited actions specifically, from grave 
sins like idolatry to minor ones such as the consumption of pork, 
and associates them with rewards and punishments.  These 
prohibitions are not numerous, but some of them are culturally-
                                                 
55 Cragg, 15 
56 Cragg, 75 
57 Qur’an (99:6) 
58 Gätje, 178 
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specific.  A person living in a society where adultery is a mortal sin 
may be less inclined to commit such an act and thus fare better in 
the afterlife than a person living in a society where it is merely 
frowned upon.  
 Furthermore, the Qur’an frequently implies that belief is 
a division between goodness and evil, even though it does not 
make that position entirely clear.  Belief in itself may denote 
more than a belief in God, and Esposito singles out faith in the 
ultimate judgment of God, acceptance of Muhammad as the seal 
of prophecy, and thereby, faith that the Qur’an is unfailingly 
accurate as central beliefs to the faith.59  The strict laws against 
the vague concept of “idolatry” may cause a person in a 
monotheistic society to be automatically rewarded for a natural 
habit of belief while a person of equal faith in a polytheistic 
culture may be punished for what he or she assumed was a 
virtuous belief system.  The text frequently uses phrases such as 
“Those who believe in God and the Last Day, in the angels and 
the Book and the prophets” (2:177)60 to denote the righteous, 
which implies faith not only in a singular deity, but in the 
apocalyptic tradition of mainstream monotheism.  The 
injunctions to believe the words of Muhammad seem to imply 
that faith in the legitimacy of the Qur’an itself is a precondition 
of being a believer, which by extension implies that its specific 
injunctions and commandments are necessary components of 
belief as well. The specific virtuous actions mentioned in the text 
generally relate to charity and goodwill in human relations, such 
as “[giving] away [one’s] wealth to kinsfolk, to orphans, to the 
destitute, to the traveler in need and to beggars, and for the 
redemption of captives” (2:177) or to devotion to God 
specifically, such as “attending to prayers.” (2:177)61  Although 
the text does not specifically state that all unbelievers lack virtue 
entirely, it speaks of evildoers and unbelievers in a similar 
manner, and generally refers to their destiny as eternity in the 
Fire, never directly acknowledging the possibility of an unbeliever 
being accepted into Paradise. 
                                                 
59 Esposito, 68-9 
60 Qur’an 
61 Qur’an 
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 The Qur’an asserts: “None should be charged with more 
than one can bear,” but it sets out absolute principles of faith and 
action, condemning those who fail to meet certain standards to 
death and destruction, in Hell if not in this life.  This passage 
assumes then that at least the obvious and fundamental 
commandments set out by the Qur’an are within reach for all, 
and it seems to ignore the cultural or personal barriers that may 
prevent a person from reaching the realizations necessary to live 
in accordance with the principles of Islam, which reinforces the 
problematic of moral luck and raises questions about the 
methods that God uses to judge people. 
 By setting only limited behavioral standards yet issuing 
broad polemics against those who do not live according to the 
way of God, the Qur’an creates some degree of confusion about 
what makes a righteous person.  This problem is difficult for any 
religion to manage.  Some, like Sikhism, set only broad 
requirements for righteous and evil conduct, and ultimately fail 
to claim any real moral supremacy as a faith.  Others, like 
Judaism, attempt to legislate every possible aspect of behavior, 
creating hundreds of thousands of rules that few are able to 
follow precisely.  The confusion in Islam is not necessarily a 
problem for the religion—the Qur’an reminds its readers that 
judgment belongs to God alone—but it does raise questions 
about what sort of specific actions a person must take in order to 
achieve righteousness in any given situation.   
In his book The Islamic Ethics of Life, Jonathan Brockopp 
attempts to find a Qur’anic view of modern issues concerning the 
most basic religious principles about the right to live with regard 
to abortion, war, and euthanasia.  Examining both the Qur’an 
and its rich exegetical tradition, Brockopp finds legitimate 
interpretations that relate to his questions, but ultimately 
comments that no single Islamic tradition can provide a definite 
answer to these issues, even though the question deals with an 
issue as large as the taking of a life.62  The imprecision of non-
canonical tradition and the absolutist vagueness of the Qur’an 
itself may leave even the most important issues open to fallible 
human interpretation. 
                                                 
62 Brockopp, 218 
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 One of the problems with setting any real absolute 
standards for behavior is that people will inevitably attempt to 
judge others based upon those standards, even though the text 
states that “God chooses whom he will for his mercy” and as such 
specifically forbids guessing the exact standards that God uses to 
judge people. Yet by setting good and evil in such sharp contrast, 
the Qur’an gives people rough guidelines with which to judge 
human behavior, thus enabling society to condemn or reward 
people inappropriately and undermining the text’s overall 
message of submission to the will of God.  This confusion of 
morality affects even those who expressly follow the Qur’an, as it 
seems to present two mutually exclusive methods of action, 
forbidding judgment directly yet laying out incomplete standards 
by which people are able to judge others, namely belief and 
unbelief. 
 The hadiths complicate this dilemma, as they show acts 
of human judgment, by the prophet Muhammad himself.  
Muhammad makes several categories of actions, and lists specific 
actions that fulfill certain virtues and those that must be attended 
to or avoided in order to avoid sin.63  These ideas do not depart 
from the strictures of the text, but as prophetic utterances it is 
unclear whether or not they are divinely inspired, and thus 
whether they can be viewed as true or even binding 
interpretations.  More problematic are those hadiths that speak 
of conduct toward non-Muslims.  Muhammad asks rhetorically, 
“Do the Jews and Christians who read the Bible and Evangel act 
on them?” chastising these groups.  Yet he also advises, “When 
the bier of anyone passeth by thee, whether Jew, Christian, or 
Muslim, rise to thy feet.”64  The latter statement automatically 
separates People of the Book for higher esteem in the eyes of 
Muslims, while the former implies their general faults as a group.  
These statements seem to give individual Muslims the authority to 
distinguish between Muslims, People of the Book, and others, 
although the invocation that God’s mercy is being unknowable is 
made in reference to these divisions specifically.  Zepp also notes 
that the hadith tradition is not always historically reliable—
despite extensive scholarly research in the Medieval era in order 
                                                 
63 Suhrawardy, 70-79 
64 Suhrawardy, 60 
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to compile them accurately, so there is question over whether 
observing the hadith tradition is following a prophet at all.65  
Naturally, some human judgment of conduct is necessary in a 
functioning society, but stories that tell of individual cases of 
judgment, complimented by condemnations of certain groups 
(Jews, Christians, and the unspecified “pagan” cultures) within 
the text itself, seem to encourage humans to judge character 
based on those standards which “God knows and you know not.” 
(2:216)66 
 Admittedly, some philosophers—particularly those who 
have taken a mystical approach to the Qur’an—have been able to 
present a more satisfactory solution to the problem of moral luck 
by abandoning the dualism that is implied in the text and 
focusing instead on those passages which seem to bring the world 
into greater unity.  These trends, such as Sufism, have 
contributed a great deal to Islamic thought, but have never been 
dominant philosophies in mainstream Muslim society.  The one 
exception to this rule, in my judgment, is some Shi’i 
philosophers, although most members of that sect maintain a 
relatively dualistic view of the world and have a strong attachment 
to Qur’anic legalism.  Sufism is at least the dominant mystical 
tradition within Sunni Islam.  But by stepping away from the 
dualistic aspect of the Qur’an, mystic philosophers inevitably 
interpret it in a relatively complicated manner, going beyond the 
intuitive meanings of the text, and as Julian Baldick notes, 
seeking to commune with God through experience rather than 
revelation.67  Such interpretations undermine the emphasis on 
the clarity of the Qur’an and the actions that it proscribes.  When 
the dualistic nature of the text is questioned, the commandments 
of faith and unquestioning submission to God lose some 
importance, so it is difficult for Islam to avoid the moral 
problems brought on by dualism without altering the 
fundamental nature of the religion. 
 Qur’anic law is relatively limited in scope, and given that 
it applies to this life specifically, it is less dualistic, but its 
regulations are still impacted by the problem of moral luck.  Its 
                                                 
65 Zepp, 60 
66 Qur’an 
67 Baldick, 5 
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implications stretch far beyond the text itself, with most of the 
effects of luck felt in the human interactions of the world.  The 
Qur’an discusses inheritance laws excessively, stipulating various 
family members who receive certain percentages of an estate.  In 
this sense, an individual’s place within his or her family grants 
him or her greater or lesser reward according to divine law.  The 
different rights and duties of men and women in the Qur’an also 
illustrate the aspect of luck in the rewards of this life.  The fact 
that “a male shall inherit twice as much as a female” (4:10)68 
implies a moral distinction between the two genders, or at least 
inequality in the eyes of God.  These problems are not so 
intractable given that this world is inherently imperfect, but 
factors such as economic status within the world can determine 
morality.  A person with ample leisure time and resources is 
better equipped to act and give charitably if they so choose, 
enhancing their capacity to do deeds that may reflect well upon 
them in the final judgment.  A person born wealthy may have 
intentions no better or worse than a person who cannot rise out 
of poverty, but the wealthier individual is given the opportunity to 
act, whereas the poor individual may never know how he or she 
would have acted given equal opportunity. 
 The Qur’an also fails to address the issue of pre-
revelation morality.  It talks of “apostles [of whom] we have 
already told you” and “others of whom we have not yet spoken” 
who are “apostles who “brought good news to mankind and 
admonished them, so that they might have no plea against God 
after their coming.” (4:164-5).69   According to the text, prophets 
have existed in all societies and it mentions certain revelations 
(the Tawrat or Torah, the Injil or Gospels, and the Zabur or 
Psalms) specifically.  The text also mentions that these scriptures 
have been corrupted over time, yet notes that God has revealed 
messages to all peoples.70  It is unclear whether early revelations 
had a binding effect on the actions of people prior to the Qur’an 
(especially if they were unknown prior to the revelation of the 
Qur’an), but it presents a problem of justice either way.  If early 
revelations are indeed binding, then the Qur’an must account for 
                                                 
68 Qur’an 
69 Qur’an 
70 Zepp, 14 
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its insistence that these books have been either lost or corrupted, 
and so people have not been given full warning.  If not, then 
revelation seems to be a mixed blessing—an opportunity for 
those who have access to the Qur’an and reason to believe it and 
a more demanding standard of justice for those who do not.  A. 
Kevin Reinhart has analyzed various arguments concerning the 
status of pre-revelation morality, and argues that such strictures 
are often perceived as non-binding so that they do not 
undermine the moral importance of the revelation of the Qur’an, 
but that the actual legal position of the text is decidedly 
unclear.71 
 Universality is crucial to the Qur’an’s claim of justice, yet 
it addresses itself to Arab people specifically, calling itself “a Book 
of revelations well expounded, an Arabic Qur’an for men of 
knowledge.” (41:1)72  The text further claims the inimitability of 
its language as one of the strongest proofs of its truth.  This claim 
may have been authoritative in the largely non-literary society of 
Seventh Century Arabia, but it loses some legitimacy in the 
modern world, where a reader may be able to find equals to its 
eloquence and style.  This claim is even less legitimate in non-
Arabic-speaking societies, who read the Qur’an in languages that 
fail to capture the poetry and wordplay of the original text.  Thus, 
modern readers and non-Arabic-speaking readers are far more 
likely to disregard the messages of the Qur’an simply because it 
will not appear as convincing to them, and so they are 
disadvantaged by the unfortunate luck of the language barrier 
and their increased literacy. 
 The Qur’an succeeds in presenting a basic structure of 
morality, centered upon faith and charity, but it ultimately lacks 
the necessary specificity and clarity to form a clear picture of 
righteous conduct to which modern readers can reasonably 
aspire.  More significantly, the dualism of action, belief, and 
consequence that gives the text its force and certainty does not 
seem compatible with the recognition that circumstance plays a 
role in determining what is good action.  The few absolute 
standards that the Qur’an gives for judgment seem to favor some 
individuals regardless of the choices that they make. 
                                                 
71 Reinhart, 184 
72 Qur’an 
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